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ABSTRACT 
The spectacle of Bitcoin has largely overshadowed the development of the 
cryptocurrency’s underlying structure – the blockchain.  The blockchain is a type of 
digital ledger that performs a number of traditional record-keeping functions in a 
more efficient and reliable manner.  Organizations around the globe continue to 
invest heavily in blockchain technology for a myriad of purposes.  To fund these 
innovative projects, many organizations hold an Initial Coin Offering (“ICO”) in 
which “tokens” -- a blockchain’s primary means of exchanging value, proving 
ownership, and/or paying for network services -- are sold to purchasers in exchange 
for U.S. dollars.  
In many ways, ICOs are the modern equivalent of a traditional initial public 
offering (“IPO”). Tokens are often bought as a financial investment, with purchasers 
hoping to capitalize on cryptocurrency mania and reap a large return.  Indeed, some 
ICOs have exploited overzealous investors by holding fraudulent ICOs without any 
real intention of developing a functioning blockchain network.  As a result, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission largely regulates ICOs in the same manner as 
IPOs, imposing stringent reporting requirements and liability on startups and 
developers.   
However, these bad apples are in the minority and moreover, certain tokens sold 
through ICOs do not meet the classic definition of a “security.”  Utility tokens, in 
particular, are functionally distinct from a traditional security with any rise in value 
being incidental to the token’s primary utility.  Treating all crypto-tokens sold 
through ICOs as securities stifles development by imposing onerous requirements 
upon novice developers.  Current securities law exemptions are inadequate and given 
the popularity and success of many ICOs, their offerings should not be forced into 
poorly tailored regulations.  The SEC should acknowledge the unique nature of 
certain blockchain tokens and provide tailored guidance for future ICOs if this 
burgeoning industry is to flourish.   
INTRODUCTION 
“You can call me Floyd Crypto Mayweather from now on” tweeted the 
flamboyant professional boxer.1  Bullish on cryptocurrencies, Mayweather urged his 
followers to purchase the coins offered by Centra Tech in its Initial Coin Offering 
(“ICO”).2  Social media guru DJ Khaled quickly followed suit, describing Centra 
Tech and its new crypto-token as a “Game changer.”3  However, the two celebrities 
failed to disclose the payments each received in exchange for promoting the ICO.  
Several months later, the SEC filed a civil action against Centra Tech for holding a 
fraudulent ICO.4  In conjunction with its enforcement action against Centra Tech, 
the SEC ordered Mayweather and Khaled to disgorge their payments with interest.5  
                                                                                                     
1 Press Release, Two Celebrities Charged with Unlawfully Touting Coin Offerings (Nov. 29, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-268 [https://perma.cc/BF8W-3HDC].  
2 Id.  
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id.  
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Both agreed not to promote cryptocurrencies or other securities for several years.6  
Through these celebrity endorsements, Centra Tech hoped to capitalize on the mania 
surrounding cryptocurrencies and attract customers to its coin offering.   
While Centra Tech was ultimately just another fraudulent financial scheme, to 
many, cryptocurrencies are the printing press of the modern age—a currency for a 
globalized generation distrustful of traditional institutions.  Bitcoin has grabbed 
headlines with tales of fortunes won and lost, while the technical foundation of 
cryptocurrencies—the blockchain—has evolved, quietly seeping into new markets 
and industries.  The blockchain is a type of electronic ledger, a system for verifying 
transactions, maintaining online identities, and transferring digital assets.7  In many 
ways, the blockchain is nothing new, providing the same functions as an accountant’s 
books, a company’s document software, or a bank’s transaction log.  It verifies and 
proves that buyers have the money to spend and sellers actually deliver the product.8  
What distinguishes the blockchain from traditional forms of record-keeping is its 
integrity, security, and decentralized structure–blockchains remove intermediaries 
from transactions and record keeping, seeding control to the parties while providing 
an immutable record of those parties’ actions.9  
Many blockchain networks utilize cryptographic tokens (“crypto-tokens”) as 
part of their procedures and protocols.  These tokens serve many purposes: as an 
incentive to encourage active participation in the network, as a marker to signal an 
ownership interest, and as a fuel to power applications and services.10  Like Bitcoin, 
crypto-tokens often have monetary value, a consequence of the token’s utility or the 
success and size of the network.  Thus, crypto-tokens can become appreciated assets 
whose value may fluctuate over time.  For new blockchain projects, the network’s 
tokens may be the company’s most valuable asset.  Quite recently, companies have 
begun to raise capital through ICOs–a novel type of public sale.  Similar to IPOs, 
investors purchase a blockchain’s tokens using an agreed upon currency; the 
company receives capital to further develop its network while the buyer receives an 
appreciable asset.11  ICOs have exploded in popularity–since 2014 over twenty 
billion in capital has been raised through initial coin offerings.12  Despite this success, 
ICOs pose significant regulatory issues–the SEC has classified many ICOs as 
investment contracts and labeled various crypto-tokens as securities.  
 This Comment addresses the current regulatory limbo facing ICOs and 
companies utilizing blockchain technology.  Increased oversight is overdue as 
blockchain technology continues to grow and adapt, often in ways that harm 
investors and companies as seen in a number of recent enforcement actions, failed 
                                                                                                     
6 Id.  
7 See generally Klint Finley & Gregory Barber, The WIRED Guide to the Blockchain, WIRED (Jul. 9, 
2019), https://www.wired.com/story/guide-blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/6435-MKYZ].  
8 Id. 
9 Id.  
10 Shermin Voshmgir, Tokens, Cryptocurrencies & Other Cryptoassets, BLOCKCHAIN HUB BERLIN 
(2019), https://blockchainhub.net/tokens/ [https://perma.cc/B92P-4MU9].  
11 Jake Frankenfield, Initial Coin Offering (ICO), INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 20, 2018), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/initial-coin-offering-ico.asp [https://perma.cc/5PBP-HG6V].  
12 ICO Tracker – Summary Statistics, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/ico-tracker 
[https://perma.cc/W5F7-EKFT] (last visited Apr. 7, 2019).  
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offerings, and consumer fraud.  Furthermore, the meteoric ascension of Bitcoin and 
Ethereum, the world’s most popular cryptocurrencies, attracted hordes of new 
investors looking to earn quick profits and returns. While certain blockchains and 
their respective tokens do present as security offerings, to characterize all tokens as 
securities would injure many blockchain initiatives.  Without narrowly tailored 
regulations, startups and emerging blockchain technology will be stifled by 
registration requirements and the threat of fines and sanctions.  The SEC has a rare 
opportunity to craft regulations that will accommodate the unique nature of 
blockchain technology and ICOs while still protecting investors from fraud and other 
economic harm.  ICOs need not be another example of the law failing to catch up 
with technology.  This Comment will attempt to provide recommendations to meet 
this admittedly lofty goal.  
Because blockchain technology is technologically complex, it is first important 
to establish a firm foundation before applying modern securities laws.  Thus, Part I 
will introduce blockchain technology broadly, beginning with a brief history of its 
origins as a component of the cryptocurrency Bitcoin.  Part I will also explore 
blockchain functionality and how its benefits are currently applied across various 
markets.  Part II will examine the structure of ICOs, their ostensible purpose, and 
their execution.  Part III will look at the SEC’s traditional framework for defining 
and governing the sale of securities under the Howey Test.   The Howey Test is 
construed broadly and historically and has been applied to a number of non-
traditional securities settings.  However, the SEC has formally stated that some ICOs 
may qualify as securities offerings, depending on a number of individualized factors 
and circumstances.  Part III will look closely at these factors as well as the various 
actions (or lack thereof) the SEC has taken against ICOs.  Finally, Part IV will 
forecast the future of ICO regulations, including voluntary attempts by blockchain 
networks to bring their offerings into compliance with U.S. law.  
Defining ICOs as securities offerings and bringing them under the regulatory 
umbrella of the SEC will have significant benefits to both individual and institutional 
investors.  The greater oversight will almost certainly eliminate the fraudulent 
offerings and projects that currently plague the industry.  However, it is this 
Comment’s position that given the unique character of purpose of blockchain 
technology, a blanket securities classification would prohibitively disrupt and 
undermine the small start-ups looking to develop and market products that could 
revolutionize global transactions.   
SIGNIFICANCE OF A SECURITIES CLASSIFICATION  
 As a threshold matter, it is worth addressing the significance of registering 
ICOs as securities.  Given the consequences of running afoul of the SEC, some may 
wonder why blockchain developers do not simply register their securities and abide 
by the regulations governing their sale.  Some larger-scale ICOs that are integrated 
within larger companies certainly have the resources and legal counsel to do so 
safely.  However, for small-scale blockchain developers hoping to secure additional 
funding, registering a token as a security comes with significant burdens.  As one 
commentator notes, “[r]egistration of a traditional underwritten public offering is 
time consuming and expensive, and, once an issuer becomes public, carries with it 
2020] FOR LOVE OR FOR PROFIT? 159 
extensive reporting requirements.”13  For one, Section Five of the Securities Act of 
1933 (“‘33 Act”) prohibits the advertising or sale of any security in the absence of 
an effective registration statement.14  Registration statements are detailed, requiring, 
among other things, three years of audited financial statements including any debt 
obligations, the number of shares, total market capitalization, etc.15  While the SEC 
provides relaxed standards for “emerging growth companies,” even these reduced 
standards mandate two years of audited financial history.16  Much of this information 
is simply unavailable to early-stage blockchain companies who have yet to establish 
a viable product, customer base, or a financial history complete enough to satisfy 
registration requirements.  
Additionally, virtually any party17 who helped to prepare the registration 
statement is strictly liable in law or equity for any material misstatements contained 
therein.18  While Section Eleven provides a safe harbor for non-expert statements 
made in good faith,19 it is unlikely developers could take advantage of this immunity 
given the highly technical nature of blockchain products–expert statements would 
almost certainly be required in any registration statement.  More significantly, Rule 
10b-5 of the Exchange Act prohibits any fraudulent act or omission in connection 
with the sale of a security.20  While Rule 10b-5 requires that a plaintiff properly plead 
all the necessary elements (including scienter), the Rule remains incredibly popular 
in securities class actions because it contains an implied private right of action.21  
Rule 10b-5 poses a serious threat to ICOs registered with the SEC; powerful law 
firms across the country scour the securities landscape for failed offerings, often 
initiating specious class actions based solely on a security’s decline in value.  For 
example, in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, the Supreme Court noted how 
an objectively weak complaint still has substantial value to a plaintiff if he can move 
past the dismissal and summary judgement stages:  
[I]n the field of federal securities laws governing disclosure of information even a 
complaint which by objective standards may have very little chance of success at 
trial has a settlement value to the plaintiff out of any proportion to its prospect of 
success at trial so long as he may prevent the suit from being resolved against him 
by dismissal or summary judgment. The very pendency of the lawsuit may frustrate 
or delay normal business activity of the defendant which is totally unrelated to the 
lawsuit.22 
Given that blockchain technology is still in its infancy, it is inevitable that some 
                                                                                                     
13 Kennedy Luvai, The End of the ICO Gold Rush: The Regulatory Squeeze on Token Offerings as a 
Funding Mechanism for Blockchain-Related Ventures?, 31 UTAH B.J. 20, 20 (2018). 
14 See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2012).  
15 See 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(1)–(32) (1998).  
16 15 U.S.C. § 77g(a)(2) (2012).  
17 Including every individual who signed the registration statement as well as the company’s directors, 
accountants, engineers, appraisers or underwriters.  
18 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(1)–(5) (1998). 
19 See § 77k(b)(3).  
20 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).  
21 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (characterizing Rule 10b-5 as 
a “judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn”).  
22 Id. at 740.  
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ICOs will collapse and fail, with any tokens losing their monetary value.  These 
failed offerings will be subject to a litany of lawsuits if ICOs are forced to abide by 
securities regulations.  Even a nominal decline in value–contrary to representations 
made in a prospectus or registration statement–will trigger potential liability.   Small 
ICOs simply do not have the resources to defend such lawsuits and will needlessly 
expend funds combating their claims.23  Furthermore, the SEC’s current registration 
requirements impose financially onerous burdens on companies.  One report by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers found IPO registration requirements cost companies an 
estimated $3.7 million.24  The average ICO will be unable to afford these costs.  
I. BLOCKCHAIN HISTORY AND FUNCTIONALITY 
A. Bitcoin Origins 
Since its inception in 2009, the enigmatic cryptocurrency Bitcoin continues to 
inspire technology zealots, irritate the Department of Justice, and above all, confuse 
the public.25  Satoshi Nakamoto, the pseudonymous creator of Bitcoin, envisioned 
the cryptocurrency as a decentralized payment system for Internet commerce that 
eschewed financial institutions or third-parties intermediaries.26  Bitcoin itself is 
nothing more than a line of code, its value derived from the amount in circulation 
and its use within the economy.27  Bitcoins are stored in virtual “wallets” consisting 
of a “public” key and a “private” key.28  The public key, as the name implies, is 
publicly available, functioning as an address to which Bitcoins can be sent.29  By 
contrast, the private key is a closely guarded cryptographic secret because it permits 
a wallet’s owner to access, spend, and/or transfer Bitcoins across the network.30  
However, because Bitcoin only exists electronically, the person to whom Bitcoins 
are sent cannot verify that the sender did not spend the same coins somewhere else, 
                                                                                                     
23 Securities law contains a number of exemptions to registration, such as a private placement for 
accredited investors. See Luvai, supra note 13, at 20.  This option, while attractive, would unfairly limit 
investment to only the wealthiest individuals or corporations.  
24 Kenyon Briggs, Taming the Wild West: How the SEC Can Legitimize Initial Coin Offerings, Protect 
Consumers from Bad Actors, and Encourage Blockchain Development, 2 BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & 
TAX L. REV. 424, 443 (2018).  
25 See Zoë Bernard, Everything You Need to Know About Bitcoin, Its Mysterious Origins, and the Many 
Alleged Identities of its Creator, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 10, 2018), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/bitcoin-history-cryptocurrency-satoshi-nakamoto-2017-12#why-
would-the-inventor-of-the-worlds-most-important-cryptocurrency-choose-to-remain-anonymous-12 
[https://perma.cc/U6FM-F4NR].  
26 Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AP8W-LRF8] (last visited Aug. 29, 2019).   
27 David Perry, Why Bitcoin Has Value, NASDAQ (Jan. 13, 2017, 11:17 AM), 
https://www.nasdaq.com/article/why-bitcoin-has-value-cm733313 [https://perma.cc/YS44-M49N] 
(noting that Bitcoin creates value by “splitting a finite currency supply more ways”).  
28 Joseph Guzzetta, How Bitcoin Works: A Technological Description of Blockchain-Based 
Cryptocurrencies for Non-Technical Lawyers, 59 ORANGE COUNTY L. 34, 35 (2017). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. Guzzetta references the collapse of Mt. Gox, a popular Bitcoin wallet and exchange platform, as 
one prominent example of why private keys are valuable to the user and system. Id. 
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a problem referred to as the “double spending” problem.31  To resolve this issue in 
the absence of a trusted third party, Nakamoto theorized that all Bitcoin transactions 
must be publicly recorded.  More importantly, the network must reach a consensus 
on a single history of transactions that accurately reflects the true order in which 
Bitcoins were received and spent.32  
Anticipating the double spending problem, Nakamoto built a solution into the 
Bitcoin network.  Nakamoto introduced a public ledger system where each Bitcoin 
transaction is collected into a “block” which is then distributed to various nodes in 
the network.33  Using a complex cryptographic process known as “hashing,” a group 
of nodes (“miners”) attempt to reconcile the previous block of transactions with the 
new block by solving a difficult mathematical puzzle.34  This process is known as 
“proof of work” and requires an enormous amount of computing power to properly 
execute.35  The result is a permanent and immutable history of every Bitcoin 
transaction, mathematically “chained” together and organized into blocks.36  To 
undermine such a system, an actor would have to alter the entire transaction history 
(the hash) of that particular coin by redoing the proof of work for that block and 
every subsequent block–a task that increases exponentially in difficulty as more 
blocks are added to the chain.37  This trusted and immutable record of transactions is 
referred to as the blockchain.   
As mentioned, mining and validating a block of transactions requires an 
immense amount of computing power and thus an immense amount of electricity.38  
To incentivize miners to perform this difficult cryptoanalysis, the Bitcoin blockchain 
rewards the first miner to solve the block’s mathematical puzzle with newly minted 
Bitcoin.39  The release of new Bitcoins serves the dual purpose of distributing new 
coins into circulation (because no central authority exists, such as a bank, to mint 
new coins) while also rewarding miners for the electricity and CPU power 
consumed.40  Glynn Bird, in an article written in the IBM Watson and Cloud 
Learning Center provides a succinct summary of the mining process:  
As well as securing the list of transactions cryptographically, block chains also 
provide a distributed consensus of the state of the database. It ensures that value 
transfers happen once or not at all, giving the application developer the peace of 
                                                                                                     
31 Nakamoto, supra note 26.  
32 Id. 
33 Mike Orcutt, Blockchain: What Is It?, MIT TECH. REV., May/June 2018, at 18, 19.  
34 Id. at 20; see also Guzzetta, supra note 28, at 36.  
35 Orcutt, supra note 33, at 21.  
36 Id. at 22. 
37 Nakamoto, supra note 26, at 3; Guzzetta, supra note 28, at 37 (observing that by adding the previous 
block’s hash to the new block, the chain becomes “locked down” such that any fraudulent changes 
reverberate through the network and become quite obvious). The difficulty of altering a previous block 
is the central reason why the ledger itself remains secure over time. 
38 For example, a Bitcoin mining operation with 7,000 machines in St. Hyacinthe, Quebec, uses about 
ten megawatts of electricity a day, more than double the usage of a neighboring hockey arena on a sold-
out night. Kathryn Miles, The Little Coin That Ate Quebec, MIT TECH. REV., May/June 2018, at 34, 38.  
39 Orcutt, supra note 33, at 19.  
40 Nakamoto, supra note 26, at 4 (“The steady addition of a constant of amount of new coins is 
analogous to gold miners expending resources to add gold to circulation. In our case, it is CPU time and 
electricity that is expended.”). 
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mind that, once stored, their data is both immutable and trusted. The block chain 
network effectively picks a random node to generate the next block in the chain by 
giving that privilege to the node that solves a mathematical task that takes a lot of 
computing power. The node that finds a solution to the problem nominates the next 
block in the chain and publishes it, where it is verified by others in the network. The 
winning node is rewarded for this “proof of work” with freshly minted crypto-
currency and transaction fees collected from the transactions’ creators.41 
The significance of the mining process is that instead of trusting a bank, 
government, or other financial third party to validate a transaction, trust is 
mathematically guaranteed throughout the network.42  The blockchain itself 
functions as the trusted intermediary through which transactions are executed and 
verified.  Consider the following description of the blockchain:  
Blockchain is a technology that allows computers connected over the Internet to 
reach agreement over shared data. A block is a defined storage space over a 
distributed network of such computers. Every time these computers—called 
nodes—cryptographically reach agreement over a transaction, a new block gets 
added to the last transaction in the chain of blocks. In this way, each transaction gets 
permanently recorded and sequentially updated, thereby keeping an inerasable 
historical trail of transactions starting from the very first transaction.43 
Put a different way “[the] blockchain is an open, distributed ledger that can 
record transactions between two parties efficiently and in a verifiable and permanent 
way.”44  Because it is so difficult to alter a previous transaction block, the ledger is 
virtually immune from fraudulent changes.  
However, it is also worth noting the Bitcoin ledger is functionally restricted–it 
can only track and authenticate the movement of Bitcoins from one address to the 
next.  Nakamoto’s primary impetus for creating the blockchain was to solve the 
double spending problem inherent in non-tangible digital assets.45  Nakamoto was 
not concerned with creating a general purpose blockchain that could verify any kind 
of transaction, he was only interested in developing a new digital currency.  
B. Blockchain Applications in the Market 
Since 2013, Bitcoin has experienced an astronomical rise in value–on May 20, 
2013, a single Bitcoin was worth 131 U.S. dollars,46 but by December 17, 2017, it 
                                                                                                     
41 Glynn Bird, Block Chain Technology, Smart Contracts and Ethereum, IBM DEVELOPER (May 19, 
2016), https://developer.ibm.com/clouddataservices/2016/05/19/block-chain-technology-smart-
contracts-and-ethereum/ [https://perma.cc/MVM4-QWGY]. 
42 What is Bitcoin Mining?, BITCOINMINING.COM, https://www.bitcoinmining.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/C7E4-Z9M4] (last visited Aug. 30, 2019) (“The primary purpose of mining is to allow 
Bitcoin nodes to reach a secure, tamper-resistant consensus.”). 
43 Jaipat Jain, Introduction to Blockchain for Lawyers, N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, (May 10, 2018), at 
20180510P NYCBAR 1). 
44 Marco Iansiti & Karim Lakhani, The Truth About Blockchain, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan.-Feb. 2017), 
https://hbr.org/2017/01/the-truth-about-blockchain [https://perma.cc/64WC-XTFN].  
45 Nakamoto, supra note 26, at 2.  
46 Bitcoin Price, MARKETS INSIDER, https://markets.businessinsider.com/currencies/btc-usd 
[https://perma.cc/N8QB-YGQ2 ] (last visited Oct. 29, 2019). 
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was worth almost twenty thousand U.S. dollars.47  The almost absurd rise in value 
led many financial experts to declare the currency an economic bubble, the result of 
intense speculation and an overhyped market.48  One need only take a look at recent 
Bitcoin headlines to see the media’s obsession with the currency’s value, its illicit 
use, and the general confusion regarding its existence.49  Much of this criticism is 
warranted; the currency’s history is marred by fraud, contraband, and fortunes won 
and lost.50  However, this fixation obfuscates the truly innovative nature of Bitcoin’s 
underlying technology: the blockchain itself.51  
While the Bitcoin network may have been the blockchain’s first practical 
application, it soon became apparent the technology had significant potential to 
support the world’s increasingly complex web of transactions.  For one, any 
application run on the blockchain does not require its own storage; transaction 
records are stored across the distributed network.52  Furthermore, the decentralized 
ledger distribution provides a trusted consensus–a function currently performed by 
third party intermediaries.53  Additionally, anonymity is inherent to the structure of 
the blockchain, and while this feature has been widely disclaimed by the media as a 
tool of online drug dealers, it is easy to envision a different application in which 
anonymity is essential.54 
 Smart contracts have emerged as one viable application for the blockchain; 
negotiated terms and conditions are encoded onto the blockchain and important 
events are automatically executed upon the occurrence of specified conditions.55  The 
                                                                                                     
47 David Morris, Bitcoin Hits a New Record High, But Stops Short of $20,000, FORTUNE (Dec. 17, 
2017), http://fortune.com/2017/12/17/bitcoin-record-high-short-of-20000/ [https://perma.cc/B55P-
9KY4].  
48 Id.   
49 See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, Is Bitcoin a Waste of Electricity, or Something Worse? N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/28/business/economy/bitcoin-electricity-
productivity.html [https://perma.cc/2NMR-CU3W]; Noah Smith, Yep, Bitcoin was a Bubble. And it 
Popped, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-12-11/yep-
bitcoin-was-a-bubble-and-it-popped [https://perma.cc/BZ2X-92BX].  
50 See, e.g., Manoj Sharma, 5 Bitcoin Disasters of All Time; Why It’s Never Safe to Invest in Virtual 
Currency, BUSINESS TODAY, https://www.businesstoday.in/exclusive/rebrain-or-rot/bitcoin-disasters-
virtual-currency-cryptocurrency-invest-in-bitcoin/story/265555.html [https://perma.cc/G8R5-6EV9 ] 
(last updated Dec. 22, 2017); Nathaniel Popper & Rachel Abrams, Apparent Theft at Mt. Gox Shakes 
Bitcoin World, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/25/business/apparent-
theft-at-mt-gox-shakes-bitcoin-world.html [https://perma.cc/2ACX-Z292].  
51 See also Iansiti & Lakhani, supra note 44 (describing blockchains not as disruptive technology that 
will usurp traditional business models but as a foundational technology with “the potential to create new 
foundations for our economic and social systems”); Michael Casey & Paul Vigna, In Blockchain We 
Trust, MIT TECH. REV. 10, 12 (May/June 2018) (“The real promise of blockchain technology, then, is 
not that it could make you a billionaire overnight or give you a way to shield your financial activities 
from nosy governments. It’s that it could drastically reduce the cost of trust by means of a radical, 
decentralized approach to accounting–and, by extension, create a new way to structure economic 
organizations.”).  
52 Bird, supra note 41.  
53 Id.  
54 Id.  
55 We Have a Few Words for You, MIT TECH. REV. 25, 25 (May/June 2018) (defining smart contracts as 
“a computer program stored in a blockchain that automatically moves digital assets between accounts if 
conditions encoded in the program are met. It serves as a way to create a mathematically guaranteed 
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Ethereum Project is one popular platform for building and executing smart 
contracts.56  Applications created in Ethereum “can hold value, store data, and 
encapsulate code to perform computing tasks,”57 functionality applicable to a broad 
range of services. Like all public blockchains, the cryptography and hashing 
algorithms needed to ensure the accuracy and reliability of transactions requires 
immense computing power distributed across the network.  In the case of Ethereum, 
the network pays for computing power through the exchange of the network’s native 
token “Ether.”58  Ether is “the crypto-fuel for the Ethereum network” and is 
exchanged between developers and miners alike.59  Thus, any application running on 
the Ethereum platform requires Ether to validate transactions or execute contract.  
Similar to Bitcoin, Ether may be acquired through mining (successfully completing 
the proof of work needed to verify a block of transactions) or purchased on a 
secondary exchange.60   
 In many ways, the Ethereum platform was the spark that illuminated the 
potential of blockchain technology.  On a commercial level, companies across 
various industries have begun to develop blockchain products.  For instance, in the 
financial sector, both Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan recently contributed capital to 
blockchain start-up Axoni, helping the company to raise thirty-two million dollars in 
funding.61  Even more notably, Axoni partnered with the Depository Trust and 
Clearing Corporation (“DTCC”), a behemoth in the post-trade securities processing 
industry, to convert DTCC’s Trade Platform Warehouse (which services virtually 
every derivatives dealer across the globe) to a blockchain platform.62  Axoni’s 
technology advertises robust data privacy, full lifecycle management, and automated 
regulatory reporting as some of blockchain’s many benefits.   
Even the State Department has begun exploring blockchain technology as the 
Department updates their IT infrastructure.63  For example, a spokesman for the 
Department identified foreign aid as one possible application for blockchains, 
helping to combat fraud, corruption and inefficiency within the distribution chain.64  
In a similar vein, the World Food Programme recently instituted “Building Blocks”–
a blockchain application designed to reduce the transaction costs associated with 
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providing foreign aid.65  Running on a private version of Ethereum,66 Building 
Blocks allows the WFP to transfer cash directly to individuals who then verify their 
identity using an iris scanner.67  As of October 2018, more than 100,000 refugees in 
Jordan redeemed foreign aid through this program, reducing transaction fees by 
ninety-eight percent.68   
Beyond humanitarian aid, even the legal profession has taken notice of the 
blockchain.  For example, in a recent Above the Law post, finance professor Michael 
McDonald noted how much of the work attorneys perform involves facilitating the 
secure transfer of assets69–a service that could be made obsolete through blockchain 
and smart contracts.  Another commentator noted that “the underlying technology 
behind Bitcoin, known as blockchain, is being used by a growing number of 
companies, banks and financial institutions, and it could fundamentally change the 
legal industry in the coming years.”70  Indeed, several companies have begun to offer 
blockchain based products directly to the legal industry.71  For example, blockchain 
start-up Integra recently introduced a “utility” blockchain built on IBM’s own 
blockchain platform.72  Integrating directly into a company’s existing document 
software, Integra is designed to improve data exchanges between law firms and 
corporate legal departments.73  Integra’s software does not run on a publicly available 
blockchain nor is it powered by a cryptocurrency, rather, it is a privately held 
network “governed by the legal industry itself.”74   
On a policy level, 250 companies, law firms, and universities recently created 
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the Global Legal Blockchain Consortium to “develop standards to govern the use of 
blockchain technology in the business of law.”75  The group helps to facilitate the 
integration of blockchain platforms (including the Integra ledger mentioned above) 
into existing legal software.76  While much of the technology pioneered by these 
companies remains in its infancy, the trend is unmistakable–blockchain ledger 
technology is here to stay and the legal industry would be remiss if it was not at least 
generally familiar with its functions and principles.  
C. Blockchain Classifications 
While all blockchains generally share similar characteristics (a distributed 
ledger and cryptographic mechanisms for achieving network consensus77), 
progressive research has led to a functional divergence as new blockchain projects 
attempt to meet the needs of private industry–creating what are now known as public 
and private (or “permissioned”) blockchains.78  In contrast to public blockchains 
where any participant can join, private blockchains require the network’s permission 
before a participant is granted entry and allowed to execute the network’s protocols.79  
Private blockchains, which are popular among industries where “security, identity, 
and role definition are important,”80  are often configured to restrict access to certain 
information and provide network participants with a defined role.81  For example, 
Ripple is a private blockchain that uses a native crypto-token as a “bridge currency” 
to assist financial institutions with cross border payments.82  The Ripple network 
only permits certain “validators” such as Microsoft or MIT to participate, allowing 
the network to control new entrants.83  However, private blockchains such as Ripple 
have faced criticism for not being decentralized enough.84 
By contrast, public blockchains such as Bitcoin are open to any participant 
willing to download the software and execute the consensus protocol.  Transactions 
may be viewed by anyone in the network and certain addresses quickly become 
linked to specific individuals or organizations.  Additionally, they require an 
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immense amount of electricity for their proof-of-work and in terms of sheer volume, 
process far more transactions than private blockchains.  Finally, these ledgers most 
often require crypto-tokens to incentivize network nodes to perform the necessary 
proof-of-work.  While the trust mechanism may be more powerful within a public 
network, public ledgers lack scalability and continue to struggle with slow 
transaction processing times.85   
While a public ledger is essential for Bitcoin to function as a currency, it does 
little to incentivize private industry adoption where parties have defined roles and 
little tolerance for slow processing speeds.  This is why permissioned or private 
blockchains are favored among private industry and business enterprises–they permit 
only identified parties to participate in the network, allow for certain transactions to 
remain confidential, and are able to scale up processing output to meet network 
demand.86  Furthermore, permissioned blockchains generally do not require a native 
cryptocurrency to incentivize proof-of-work.  Instead, each node is incentivized by 
the desire for lower costs, higher speed and ease of information sharing.87  By 
reducing network size and scope, permissioned networks increase processing speed 
and overall efficiency.88  However, greater speed and efficiency come at a cost: 
Permissioned ledgers require a centralized service or authority to grant network entry 
and trust is achieved through the network’s unique consensus algorithm rather than 
through a public consensus.89  While the central entity does not process or 
authenticate transactions, it is still the keyholder to the network itself.  Finally, 
permissioned blockchains are often limited in their ability to transfer digital assets–
a necessary feature in the execution and/or deployment of smart contracts.90 
Whether a blockchain utilizes a private or public ledger has additional 
consequences relevant to this Comment, specifically the need for a crypto-token.  For 
example, Hyperledger is a fast growing blockchain platform launched by the Linux 
Foundation and “has become the de-facto standard for enterprise blockchain 
platforms.”91  Like Ripple, Hyperledger Fabric is a private ledger marketed to 
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enterprises with known participants, confidential transactions, and a growing need 
for fast, decentralized transaction verification.92  Hyperledger is “cryptocurrency 
agnostic”  meaning the platform does not require a cryptocurrency for the ledger to 
function.93  However, token use is not entirely precluded; developers are permitted 
to “code in” tokens for specific applications, perhaps as a way to manage digital 
identities, assets, or value transfers.94   
One Hyperledger platform, Sawtooth, heralds itself as “highly modular,” and 
“aims to keep distributed ledgers distributed and to make smart contracts safe for 
enterprise use.”95  However, because Sawtooth is a blockchain platform designed for 
generalized enterprise use, some smart contracts deployed on Sawtooth will involve 
value transfers and will likely require crypto-tokens to facilitate such a purpose.96  
However, smart contracts laden with crypto-tokens are not necessarily permitted to 
interact with other smart contracts on the platform.97  This problem is further 
exasperated by Sawtooth’s generalized operability–the platform supports smart 
contracts written in different programming languages which, without a shared 
language, will have difficulty interacting with one another.98  To solve this problem, 
developers from the company Pokitdok published a detailed proposal and guide for 
integrating general token functionality into Hyperledger Sawtooth.99   
The Pokitdok whitepaper draws attention to limitations of blockchains operating 
without any token functionality.  Say, for example, a supply chain adopted a 
permissioned blockchain structure to automate and track goods as they traveled 
through commerce.  As with all permissioned networks, the central authority will 
invite network participants while allocating roles and refining permissions among 
the participants.  If the supply chain needs to interact with a secondary smart contract 
or a third party, the new entrant will need to be verified and invited into the private 
network before any value or monetary exchange can occur.  Furthermore, if the 
secondary smart contract uses a programming language different from the other 
network participants, it will have trouble transferring value or communicating with 
the central, permissioned blockchain.  The Pokitdok white paper attempts to simplify 
this process by introducing a crypto-token that, when deployed and exchanged by 
smart contracts operating on a Sawtooth network, will permit value transfers and 
identify verifications between different “families” of smart contracts.100  The token 
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itself effectively assumes some of the functions of the central entity, permitting 
communication, value transfers, and ensuring trust between otherwise isolated 
applications.101 
Another Hyperledger progeny titled “Project Indy” recently introduced a 
blockchain platform designed specifically for decentralized identity verification, 
aiming to solve the fundamental question of “who am I dealing with?” when doing 
business online.102  The lead developer of Project Indy, an organization called the 
Sovrin Foundation, has begun to explore the possibility of introducing tokens to the 
Indy network as a means of payment for the network’s decentralized, identity 
verification services.103  Eschewing traditional online payment systems that are often 
slow and tend to prioritize only high value verifications, banks or other institutions 
would instead pay for identity verification services using Project Indy’s tokens.104  
Purchased from the Indy network itself or from a secondary market, the amount of 
tokens required will vary according to the size and complexity of the verification 
requested.105  Project Indy attempts to find a beneficial compromise between private 
and public ledgers.106   
One theme emerging from the various Hyperledger projects is that digital value 
transfers and identity verifications often require a crypto-token even in the context 
of permissioned blockchains.  Therefore, it would not be unusual for a private 
blockchain to hold an ICO as a means of distributing such tokens and raise necessary 
capital.  For private, industry level blockchains, ICO token sales would likely be 
directed towards other industry participants with whom the network is likely to do 
business.  This affords such entities a planning opportunity with respect to securities 
laws, namely, to secure a registration exemption as a “private placement.”  
D. Blockchain Token Classifications 
Similar to private/public blockchains, crypto-tokens can take many forms.  
Broadly speaking, crypto-tokens are simply digital substitutions for fiat currency that 
use cryptography, rather than a central bank or reserve, as its security measure.107  A 
crypto-token is a single unit of the cryptocurrency.108  The most significant difference 
is quite obviously the digital characteristics of crypto-tokens; they are intangible and 
ownership is determined according to cryptographic rules rather than physical 
possession.109  The SEC has chosen not to classify cryptocurrencies but instead 
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defines them according to their particular function within a blockchain, resulting in 
significant regulatory ambiguity.110  For example, in its first significant discussion 
of cryptocurrencies/tokens as securities, the SEC stated:  
Accordingly, the Commission deems it appropriate and in the public interest to issue 
this Report in order to stress that the U.S. federal securities law may apply to various 
activities, including distributed ledger technology, depending on the particular facts 
and circumstances, without regard to the form of the organization or technology 
used to effectuate a particular offer or sale.111  
Because of this fact-specific analysis, the SEC has defined some crypto-tokens 
as “securities” under the traditional Howey Test while labeling others as 
“commodities.”112  Thus, before applying any regulatory framework, it is first 
necessary to accurately describe a crypto-token’s purpose within a blockchain.  For 
example, it is possible that a particular crypto-token is not a crypto-token at all but 
is better described as a “commodity,” a designation exempting that network’s 
blockchain from a host of laws and regulations.113 
To begin, tokens are simply “representation[s] of digital asset[s].”114  In the 
context of the Bitcoin and Ethereum blockchains, the networks’ tokens are 
synonymous with their underlying cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin and Ether respectively.  
Tokens do not have intrinsic value but may be used to represent anything of value 
such as currencies (digital or otherwise), commodities, or even identities as 
mentioned above.115  Under the general umbrella of tokens, blockchain developers 
and industry proponents identify three types of tokens within a distributed ledger: 
user tokens, equity tokens, and debt tokens.116  User tokens are “a form of digital 
currency needed to access the service provided by the distributed network.”117  
Conversely, equity tokens finance the network’s development and can be viewed as 
“cryptographic shares of a network.”118  Finally, debt tokens are similar to “short 
term loans” with associated interest rates.119   
One commentator identifies two categories of tokens: investment and utility.120 
An investment token is analogous to a traditional security like corporate stock, LLC 
membership interests, or partnership interests. A utility token is intended to facilitate 
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access to a product or service on the digital platform or network thus deriving value 
primarily from consumptive use, meaning that it may be analogized to a gift card or 
software license.121   
Utility tokens possess a “non-incidental” technical function within the 
blockchain and are best analogized as the fuel that powers the network’s applications, 
services, or contracts, whereas equity tokens may represent an ownership interest 
and/or the right to receive profits.122  Most commentators and blockchain experts 
draw distinctions between utility and equity tokens.123 
For purposes of this analysis, two general types of tokens will be defined and 
discussed: utility and equity tokens.  Utility tokens are necessary for a user to engage 
with the services offered by a blockchain platform.  Equity tokens, by contrast, are 
“stock” in the network, representing an ownership share and entitling the owner to 
“proceeds” from the network.  Both types of tokens may increase in value as a 
blockchain increases in scale and efficiency.  The nuanced distinctions between 
utility and equity tokens becomes dispositive when analyzing whether a particular 
ICO qualifies as a sale of securities under the Howey Test.  
II. THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF AN INITIAL COIN OFFERING 
A. The Age of the Initial Coin Offering 
 In many ways, an ICO is no different than a traditional IPO–both offerings have 
the goal of raising capital to fund a company’s future development by selling 
“shares” of the company to the public.  One recent commentator defined ICOs as “a 
sale of digital assets (‘coins’ or ‘tokens’) to the public by an entity seeking to raise 
capital.”124  The origins of the ICO date back to a 2013 Bitcoin conference in San 
Jose in which a young panelist by the name of J.R. Willett proposed that innovative 
protocols could be written on top of Bitcoin, containing new features which could be 
used as advertising to venture capitalists.125  The developers would then offer a piece 
of equity in the new protocol to any investor willing to send Bitcoin to the 
developer’s address.126  Developers would use the Bitcoin capital to fund the project 
itself.127  It would be years before blockchain startups would realize the massive 
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potential in Willett’s idea but when they finally did, the momentum was electrifying.  
While an IPO is a significant milestone for any company, most often occurring 
many years into a company’s lifespan, ICOs, by contrast, are often the first step a 
blockchain-based company takes in its business growth and development.  Indeed, 
with the rise of so many blockchain projects, companies are increasingly turning to 
ICOs to raise initial capital for the development of products.128  For example, in 2017, 
roughly 350 ICOs were held across the world, raising almost $6 billion in capital.129  
This figure was quickly surpassed in the first ten months of 2018: 450 ICOs raised 
almost $14 billion in capital.130  In terms of capital raised, the average ICO size is 
also rising rapidly: increasing from $5.96 million in 2016 to $25.72 million by the 
end of 2018.131  This staggering increase in capital and the number of ICOs held is 
indicative of their potency and effect on the market.  For example, the total market 
capitalization for cryptocurrencies rose from $17.7 billion to over $650 billion by 
the end of 2017, a 2700% increase over the year, a feat that took the S&P 500 several 
decades to achieve.132 
The specific structure of an ICO depends on the nature and function of the token 
being offered.  Most ICOs begin with the publication of a white paper describing the 
project and the token offered.133  Tokens are generally offered as either utility tokens 
(granting the purchaser future access to the blockchain’s services) or as equity tokens 
(representing a “share” in the company).134  Coindesk, the leading informational and 
news site for blockchain technology,135 recently detailed the differences between 
equity and utility token ICOs.136  With respect to utility ICOs, after publishing a 
white paper, companies will typically release the network’s source code to the 
general public before deploying the network itself.137  Once the network is initially 
active, tokens can be acquired through mining or by purchasing them directly from 
a miner.138  As demand for the network’s services grows, so does the demand for its 
utility tokens, increasing their value within the network.  Selling utility tokens at 
such an early stage allows developers to gauge demand for the network.139  If a large 
number of users participate in the ICO, developers are gifted the capital needed to 
scale the network accordingly, but if demand does not reach a certain threshold, 
developers have the option of halting the project and refunding any capital.140  Thus, 
developers are able to avoid wasting substantial capital on a project with little 
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potential or appeal.   
Equity tokens, by comparison, bear a stronger resemblance to a traditional IPO.  
After publishing a white paper, the company will typically create a smart contract to 
be administered and deployed by the central developers.141  The developers will then 
advertise the sale of equity tokens, representing an ownership interest in the project, 
using the capital received to grow the network’s functionality.142  As the efficacy of 
the network increases, so does the value of the token.143  Equity ICOs are effectively 
selling an ownership stake in the blockchain project, representing a right to receive 
future profits as opposed to a mechanism needed to access the network’s services.  
Thus, participants in an equity ICO are more likely to consider their tokens as an 
investment rather than as a tool or a commodity.  
Besides publishing a white paper, there are other similarities between equity and 
utility ICOs.  For one, both utility and equity tokens may be sold in secondary 
markets, leading to an often capricious fluctuation in value.144  Additionally, almost 
all token purchases require the buyer to exchange either U.S. currency or other 
cryptocurrencies (typically Bitcoin or Ethereum) for the token offered in the ICO.145  
Finally, while equity tokens represent more of a traditional “share” in a company, 
both types of tokens have the potential to appreciate as the network’s profitability 
grows.  The difference is that a utility token’s increase in value is more incidental to 
the broader success of the network rather than an end in and of itself.  
B. Examples of Successful ICOs 
 Before examining the flawed ICOs launched in the last several years, it is worth 
drawing attention to a few of the more successful ones that may exemplify a positive 
model for how ICOs should operate.  In terms of sheer capital raised, the largest ICO 
to date occurred in 2018 by the Cayman-based EOS company.146  EOS raised a 
staggering $4.2 billion in capital147 through an ICO in which purchasers exchanged 
Ether tokens from the Ethereum network for new EOS tokens.148  Commentators 
were astounded by the amount raised, especially for a company that had not formally 
launched a product yet.149  EOS is a platform for running decentralized applications 
such as smart contracts and has heavily marketed itself as a direct competitor to 
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Ethereum.150  With a novel consensus algorithm, a discrete group of dedicated miners 
(twenty-one, to be specific), and a different proof of work system, EOS promises a 
more expedited and scalable network interface that can process one million 
transactions per second with the potential for even more.151  It remains to be seen if 
the EOS blockchain will emerge as a viable product. Over 100 applications are 
currently hosted on the EOS blockchain with the largest having 6000 daily active 
users.152  However, the network faced criticism for its consensus mechanism which 
values speed over integrity while others noted how the centralized authority 
functions as a single point of failure.153  The EOS token itself is best described as an 
equity token; it has no actual use within the network but any developer looking to 
launch its own application on the EOS blockchain must use the EOS tokens to 
generate its own application’s tokens.154  Thus, the token serves a gatekeeping 
function.   
 Setting aside the amount of capital raised, the 2014 Ethereum ICO represents 
one of the most effective and practical token offerings to date.  The Ethereum 
offering was not an ICO in the modern sense of the term but is better described as a 
“crowd-sale” rather than a formal token offering.  For its time, the Ethereum crowd-
sale was a massive success raising $18 million through the exchange of Bitcoin for 
Ethereum’s Ether token.155  The $18 million, managed by the platform’s governing 
non-profit,156 was used to launch “Frontier,” the network’s first smart contract 
protocol which formally opened to developers eighteen months after the crowd-
sale.157  While not termed an ICO at the time, the Ethereum crowd-sale had many 
similarities to a typical ICO.  For example, the sale was preceded by a white paper 
detailing the proposed technology.158  Perhaps anticipating the problems associated 
with Ether tokens being labeled as investments or securities, the Ethereum 
developers included the following disclaimer on its website: “Ether is a product, 
NOT a security or investment offering. Ether is simply a token useful for paying 
transaction fees or building or purchasing decentralized application services on the 
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Ethereum platform; it does not give you voting rights over anything, and we make 
no guarantees of its future value.”159 
 Despite this disclaimer, early purchasers of Ethereum were richly rewarded for 
their investment; the crypto-token launched in 2015 with a value of less than a dollar, 
rose to over $1250 before settling at $168.99 as of April 22, 2018 – currently the 
second most valuable cryptocurrency.160  Writing for the Texas A&M Law Review, 
Tiffany L. Minks reasoned that Ether is best viewed as a stock or share in a company 
because of its frequent exchanges on secondary markets.161  Despite this 
characterization, the SEC has brought no enforcement actions against Ethereum.  
 What has made Ethereum so successful is the prolific effect the platform has 
had on blockchain technology broadly.  For one, Ethereum is credited with first 
reducing smart contracts to practice and its ERC-20 token is often the standard 
followed by blockchain platforms looking to adopt a crypto-token.  Additionally, the 
ERC-20 token standard provides developers launching their own unique token with 
a common set of parameters, permitting seamless interactions with other smart 
contracts and decentralized applications.162  The ERC-20 token has made substantial 
contributions to the development of blockchain technology; without the initial capital 
generated from the Ethereum crowd sale, blockchain technology would still be in its 
infancy.  
C. The DAO report: A Failed ICO 
 For many years, the SEC was largely silent on regulating ICOs–likely because 
of the substantial uncertainty regarding the proper characterization of 
cryptocurrencies.  However, this hands-off approach changed in July 2017 with the 
SEC’s release of the DAO Report.163  The DAO Report is an excellent case study in 
ICOs, their intersection with U.S. securities law, and how, despite claims of robust 
cyber security, permissioned blockchains remain vulnerable to cyber-attacks.  DAO 
stands for Distributed Autonomous Organization and is effectively a virtual 
corporation whose structure and participation is dictated entirely by computer 
code.164  Created by a German company known as Slock.it, the DAO functioned as 
a venture capital fund administered entirely through the blockchain.  The DAO’s 
objective was to use the capital generated from the sale of equity tokens in an ICO 
to purchase a body of assets.165  The equity tokens were purchased using Ether, the 
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idea being token holders would vote on what assets the DAO would invest in and 
would then be entitled to any “dividends” resulting from that investment.166  The 
DAO blockchain was a permissioned ledger that functioned according to the 
parameters of a smart contract written by the Slock.it creators.167  
 The DAO ICO was held over the course of a month (April 30, 2016 to May 28, 
2016) and issued approximately 1.15 billion DAO tokens in exchange for $150 
million of Ether.168  Like most ICOs, the DAO first published a whitepaper,169 
created a website, and heavily advertised its project while encouraging participation 
in its ICO.170  Slock.it permitted the DAO’s code to be open source, delivering it to 
the Ethereum community for examination or possible reuse.171  Concerns about the 
code’s integrity began to emerge near the end of the offering period and in response, 
Slock.it instituted a moratorium on project funding until the vulnerabilities could be 
fixed.172  Despite these precautions, on June 17, 2016, an unknown attacker managed 
to exploit a vulnerability in the code and successfully diverted nearly a third of the 
network’s pooled Ether ($3.6 million) to an address held by the attacker.173 
 What began as an admirable attempt to revolutionize the structure of corporate 
governance and investing, ultimately ended in disaster.  It is no wonder the SEC 
chose this case as their first formal foray into ICOs.  Indeed, in their application of 
the “securities” definition under the Howey Test, the SEC closely examined the true 
functionality of the DAO tokens.174  The SEC noted that the voting rights among 
token holders were limited – voting was restricted to investment proposals that were 
approved by the Slock.it founders.175  Additionally, because many of the network’s 
participants were anonymous to one another, it was difficult for the token holders to 
join together to exercise “meaningful control” over the network.176  The SEC 
contended that the rights of the token holders were more akin to traditional corporate 
shareholders who were forced to rely on the managerial efforts of Slock.it as the 
founders of the network.177  Thus, the SEC concluded the DAO tokens had many 
characteristics of securities and were best classified as such.  
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III. THE HOWEY TEST AND SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
A. Defining “Securities” and “Investment Contracts” 
While the DAO Report was the SEC’s first substantive inquiry into initial coin 
offerings, it was not long before the Commission turned its regulatory powers to 
other ICOs.  Before detailing these regulatory actions, it is first necessary to explain 
the framework the SEC uses when evaluating ICOs, specifically the regulatory 
regimes of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “’33 Act”), the Exchange Act of 1934 (the 
“’34 Act”) and most importantly, the three prongs of the famous Howey Test.  The 
‘33 Act and the ‘34 Act require issuers and sellers of securities to undertake a number 
of affirmative actions before selling or trading in instruments classified as securities.  
For example, the ‘33 Act requires any issuer of securities to complete a detailed 
registration statement with the SEC or otherwise file for a specific exemption.178  The 
‘33 Act also authorizes private actions against sellers of securities for misleading 
statements or material omissions contained in registration statements.179  
Compounding the powers of the ‘33 Act, the ‘34 Act imposes further anti-fraud 
liability against issuers and sellers of securities, as well as additional disclosure 
requirements.180  For example, the ‘34 Act’s Rule 10b-5 authorizes private actions 
for “devices, schemes . . . to defraud” or for “any untrue statement of material 
fact.”181  Taken together, commentators note that “many businesses regard the 
detailed and complex disclosures required in registration statements, and the large 
fees charged by securities lawyers, as burdensome.”182   
Both the Acts impose substantial requirements for securities issuers and the 
consequences for violating such rules have the potential to be substantial.  Thus, 
whether a particular financial instrument or investment falls under the purview of the 
SEC is a critical business determination not to be neglected.  This determination most 
often turns on whether the particular instrument qualifies as a “security” or not.   
Decided in 1946, the seminal Supreme Court case S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co. 
establishes the formal definition of “securities” for purposes of both the ’33 Act and 
the ’34 Act.183  The defendant in Howey was a corporation that owned a citrus 
orchard, portions of which were offered to the public as a means to “finance 
additional development.”184  Buyers were offered a sales contract for the land itself 
in conjunction with an exclusive service contract giving the corporation a leasehold 
interest and authority to cultivate and sell the citrus fruit produced by the land.185  
Buyers (most often out-of-state businessmen and professionals) were enticed by the 
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corporation with the promise of substantial profits from the sale of the citrus fruit.186  
In its action against the corporation, the SEC sought injunctive relief preventing the 
corporation from selling unregistered securities using the instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce.187 
The Supreme Court evaluated the entirety of the corporation’s offering 
(advertisements, land deed, service contract, etc.), concluding that the defendant’s 
offering qualified as an unregistered investment contract under both the ’33 and ’34 
Acts.188  The Court defined an investment contract as: “a contract, transaction or 
scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to 
expect profits solely from the efforts of the promotor or a third party.”189  This four-
part test (the “Howey Test”), sets the standard for what qualifies as an investment 
contract for the sale of a security: (1) an investment of money, (2) in a common 
enterprise, (3) with an expectation of profit (4) to be derived solely from the efforts 
of others.190  In its reasoning, the Court noted that such a broad and overly inclusive 
definition “embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of 
adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the 
use of the money of others on the promise of profits.”191  Applied liberally, the 
Howey Test has found investment contracts across all manner of unusual financial 
agreements.192  
 In a subsequent case involving the definition of “securities,” the Supreme Court 
expounded upon the legislative purposes of the ‘33 and ‘34 Acts, reasoning that 
because the Acts took aim at the unregulated, profit-driven enterprises of capital 
markets, the application of those statutes must turn on the “economic realities 
underlying a transaction” and not on whether the seller actually termed his product 
a security, share, or stock.193  The methodology for applying the Howey Test results 
in highly fact-specific analysis, with one author noting: 
The intentional breadth and adaptability of the definition of investment contract 
necessarily leads to complex and fact-intensive judicial inquiries in the application 
thereof and allows for the possibility of inconsistent results between and among the 
various courts engaging in such inquiries, creating the possibility of similarly 
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situated litigants winding up with dissimilar outcomes.194 
Litigation involving the Howey Test most often focuses narrowly on one of the 
test’s four principle components rather than on the legitimacy of the test itself.195  
The first prong, an investment of money, is rarely at issue, as courts have routinely 
found an investment of money if a buyer provides consideration or gives something 
of value.196  As applied generally to ICOs, commentators agree the exchange of fiat 
currency for tokens, or even the exchange of virtual currency, satisfies this first 
element.197  Courts have analyzed the second prong, common enterprise, as requiring 
either horizonal commonality (sharing of risk between the investor and other 
investors) or vertical commonality (sharing of risk between the investor and the 
seller/promotor).198  More plainly, commonality requires the success or failure of the 
investment or project be borne together by all involved.199  
B. An Expectation of Profits from the Efforts of Others 
 The third and fourth prongs of the Howey Test result in significant difficulties 
for ICOs.  These difficulties are overshadowed by Bitcoin’s capricious valuation and 
illicit uses–widely reported in the media–and further compounded by the average 
investor having little knowledge of blockchain technology.  Finally, the ostentatious 
advertising often used by ICOs heavily promotes the profitability of crypto-tokens 
to eager and sometimes ill-informed consumers.  In United Housing Foundation v. 
Forman, the Court elaborated upon the expectation of profits prong of the Howey 
Test.  “In such cases the investor is ‘attracted solely by the prospects of a return’ on 
his investment.  By contrast, when a purchaser is motived by a desire to use or 
consume the item purchased–‘to occupy the land or to develop it themselves’. . . the 
securities laws do not apply.”200  At issue in United Housing was a large urban 
housing project administered by a non-profit co-op.  To acquire an apartment, buyers 
purchased “shares” from the co-op, entitling them to an apartment within the 
complex.201  Residents brought suit after their monthly rental charges increased 
substantially, alleging, inter alia, the illegal sale of securities in violation of the ‘33 
Act.  In holding that the housing shares were not securities, the Court rejected three 
arguments originally accepted by the lower court that “profits” were found in: the 
tax deductions available to tenants for their mortgage interest payments; the rent 
savings derived from renting an apartment at a lower cost; and the reduction in 
monthly rents derived from commercial leasing of other parts of the co-op.202  What 
distinguished the commercial transaction at issue in United Housing from traditional 
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securities transactions was that the co-op buyers were primarily motived by the 
desire to obtain housing, i.e. to purchase a commodity for personal consumption.203  
While renters undoubtedly saved money in a variety of ways by purchasing co-op 
stock, those benefits were incidental to the transaction’s true purpose.  
 In a recent law review article, author Nate Crosser argued that, to qualify as a 
security, the expectation of profits must be the primary motivation for the 
purchaser’s investment and if a purchaser is instead motivated by a desire to consume 
the product, securities laws do not apply.204  Crosser further noted that when 
construing buyers’ expectations, the SEC pays particular attention to advertising 
efforts and any “third-party comments ratified by promoter.”205  More broadly, 
author Ori Oren, writing for the Columbia Business Law Review, suggested that 
whether investors expect the protection of securities laws is also a relevant factor for 
determining their applicability.206  Support for this proposition comes from the 
Supreme Court case Landreth Timber Company v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985), 
in which the Court held federal securities law applied to the purchase of all 
outstanding stock in a lumber business.  In dicta, the Landreth Court reasoned that 
because the shares of the lumber company were referred to as “stock” and had the 
characteristics of traditional stocks, persons trading in those shares had a strong 
expectation that the transaction would be governed by the federal securities laws.207  
This is an interesting argument with respect to ICOs as utility tokens are rarely 
referred to as “stocks” or “shares” in the network but they occasionally come with 
rights similar to traditional shareholders.  However, this argument runs counter to 
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Howey that federal securities laws embody a 
flexible approach that look to the economic realities of a transaction rather than any 
labels assigned to it.  Similarly, the SEC has conclusively stated that labels are 
irrelevant for its enforcement actions.208 
 The final element of the Howey Test–profits derived from the managerial 
efforts of others–again presents significant hurdles for most ICOs.  For example in 
the DAO Report, the SEC noted investors relied upon Slock.it (the company who 
created the DAO) to provide managerial services to the network and to introduce 
investments which would generate profits.209  These services included writing the 
protocols that governed the network, producing the whitepaper and advertising 
materials, and providing cyber security in the form of ongoing monitoring.210  One 
commentator, Ori Oren, disagreed with characterizing these services as “managerial 
efforts,” noting that “[t]he economic reality of the scheme was that Slock.it and the 
Curators only contributed to the maintenance of the system, while the ‘failure or 
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success of the enterprise’–returns on investments–depend long term upon the token-
holding investors themselves.”211  Oren argues “pre-purchase services” do not, by 
themselves, represent “ongoing” managerial services for purposes of the Howey 
Test.212 
 Oren’s argument would be more persuasive if the DAO survived its initial 
launch and had the opportunity to develop its network and protocols more fully.  At 
the time of its ICO, the DAO was almost entirely the product of its founders’ efforts; 
the decentralized “reins” of the network had not yet passed to the users and thus it 
was difficult for the SEC to see the DAO as anything but the product of the efforts 
of Slock.it.  Although DAO token holders were afforded voting rights akin to 
democratic control, the SEC viewed these rights as limited and insignificant.213  In 
support of this point, the SEC cited to S.E.C. v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, in 
which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that efforts214 expended by 
participants in a multi-level marketing scheme–while the sine qua non of the 
scheme’s ultimate profitability–did not make the scheme anything less of an 
investment contract.215  This suggests that ICOs–even ones in which the entire 
success of the venture depends on the efforts of the investors/users–may still be 
investment contracts.  However, the SEC’s analysis of the DAO infrastructure may 
be superficial as noted by Oren:  
The reality was that the experimental and novel model needed ‘training wheels’ and 
safeguards to ensure this democratic and decentralized control would successfully 
function. These efforts were technical and governance-focused, not investment 
focused. Aside from the initial, exemplary investment concept said to be introduced 
by Slock.it, the future investment concepts were to be pitched, chosen, and executed 
by token holders and their code contributions.216 
It may well be that if the DAO had come to fruition and the efforts of Slock.it 
were replaced by the decentralized control of its token holders, investors would no 
longer depend on the managerial services of a third party.  The problem with this 
argument is that blockchain technology and DAOs are highly complicated and 
technical.  To successfully shift managerial efforts from developers to users will 
require users to have the necessary skills and knowledge to operate the blockchain 
network.  This will be a high hurdle for ICOs to overcome given the average 
investor/token holder likely has little knowledge of this highly technical field.  
The SEC currently adopts a fact-based, qualitative approach to determine if an 
ICO qualifies as a security offering.  For example, in its official FAQ for ICOs, the 
SEC declines to classify all ICOs as securities offerings, instead stating that based 
on specific facts and circumstances, ICOs may be securities offerings and may need 
to be registered.217  This approach appears to reflect the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
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in United Housing, noting that while tokens sold in ICOs can be called many things 
(utility, debt, equity, etc.) “merely calling a token a ‘utility’ token or structuring it to 
provide some utility does not prevent the token from being a security.”218  Current 
SEC Chairman Jay Clayton offered the following example in a public statement 
issued in December 2017:  
For example, a token that represents a participation interest in a book-of-the-month 
club may not implicate our securities laws and may well be an efficient way for the 
club’s operators to fund the future acquisition of books and facilitate the distribution 
of those books to token holders. In contrast, many token offerings appear to have 
gone beyond this construct and are more analogous to interests in a yet-to-be-built 
publishing house with the authors, books and distribution networks all to come.219 
As of November 2017, Jay Clayton stated that he had yet to see an ICO that did 
not qualify as a security offering.220 
C. Enforcement Actions Against ICOs 
Subsequent to the DAO Report and the explosion of capital raised by ICOs, the 
SEC began an enforcement crusade against various ICOs.  The initial actions were 
directed at coin offerings the SEC deemed to constitute the unregistered sale of 
securities.  These ICOs were often tainted by fraudulent business practices and 
deceptive marketing schemes that were the product of bad actors looking to 
capitalize off of crypto-mania rather than earnest blockchain developers hoping to 
fund their project.  
For example, in September 2017, the SEC filed a complaint against Nevada-
based ReCoin LLC for the unregistered sale of securities and fraudulent 
misstatements in connection with an ICO that raised $300,000 from investors.221  The 
ReCoin tokens were billed as a secure investment vehicle backed by actual 
commodities purchased using capital generated from the ICO.222  The project’s 
whitepaper stated that the token’s value could be expected to grow as the underlying 
commodities increased in value or as demand for the tokens rose.223  Contrary to their 
representations, ReCoin never purchased any real estate, diamonds, or other 
commodities to back the value of the coins and misled potential investors into 
believing that millions had been raised as a result of the venture.224 
The SEC’s civil case against ReCoin was postponed after the Department of 
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Justice filed criminal charges alleging securities fraud against ReCoin’s founder.225  
The defendant, Maksim Zaslavskiy, immediately filed a motion to dismiss, arguing 
the ReCoin tokens were not investment contracts and thus not subject to federal 
securities law.226  Ruling on the motion, the court noted that the issue of the token’s 
proper classification was a factual inquiry best resolved by a fact-finder.227  At the 
motion to dismiss stage, the court framed the issue as “whether the ‘elements of a 
profit-seeking business venture’ are sufficiently alleged in the Indictment, such that, 
if proven at trial, a reasonable jury could conclude that ‘investors provided the capital 
and shared in the earnings and profits; and the promoters managed, controlled and 
operated the enterprise.’”228  Reasoning that the indictment sufficiently alleged all 
the elements of an investment contract under the Howey Test, the court drew 
attention to ReCoin’s whitepaper which advertised the token sale as an “attractive 
investment opportunity,” comparing the company’s statements to similar speech 
found in the DAO whitepaper.229  Additionally, the court found it significant that the 
success of  ReCoin’s venture was entirely dependent on the efforts of Zaslavskiy and 
the management team; investors had no control over their investment activity nor did 
the ReCoin tokens provide any functionality aside from a pro-rata stake in the 
company itself.230 
In S.E.C. v. AriseBank, the SEC continued their crusade against fraudulent ICOs 
with a well-publicized complaint and asset seizure.  Defendant AriseBank raised 
roughly $4.25 million between June 2017 and January 2018 through private pre-sale 
sales of its propriety token “AriseCoin,”231 a figure contrary to the $410 million 
AriseCoin claimed to have raised immediately prior to its public ICO.232  In addition 
to the unregistered sale of securities, the SEC also alleged fraudulent misstatements 
by AriseBank including claims to have purchased an FDIC insured bank and the 
acquisition of a Visa backed, cryptocurrency credit card.233  To combat these grossly 
exaggerated misstatements, the SEC sought immediate injunctive relief in the form 
of restraining orders and asset freezes.234 
AriseBank attempted to be the world’s first “decentralized banking platform.”  
What is particularly interesting is how the company’s whitepaper outlined the 
token’s increase in value:  
Our goal with AriseCoin is to drive overall circulation by incentivizing [AriseCoin] 
holders to spend their extra rewarded eACO bonus coins before they expire. This 
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causes eACO currency to be used rather than just held in static accounts, which in 
turns [sic] drives and grows the market value of AriseCoin economy and thus 
increase [sic] the value of ACO holdings.235 
This nebulous and vague description is indicative of the fraudulent nature of the 
AriseBank ICO.  However, the description also suggests that the AriseCoin was to 
have an ostensible function within the AriseBank blockchain.  Perhaps the 
AriseBank developers intended their coin to have some utility within their 
blockchain network as whole, but any such intention was quickly overshadowed by 
the fraudulent actions of its founders.  
Additionally, bolstered by the SEC’s classification of certain tokens as 
“securities,” private plaintiffs have also begun filing claims against ICOs for the sale 
of unregistered securities.  For example, in Rensel v. Centra Tech, Inc., a recent class 
action brought in the Southern District of Florida, the plaintiffs alleged violations of 
Section 12(a)(1) and 15(a) of the Securities Act and sought injunctive relief for the 
unregistered sale of securities.236  At first glance, the Centra Tech ICO presents as a 
typical blockchain project and ICO launch: Centra Tech attempted to design and 
launch a crypto-currency debit card that would allow users to spend crypto-
currencies using existing credit cards such Visa and Mastercard.237  This ambitious 
objective quickly grew out of control as the project’s founders attempted to validate 
the project using spurious claims and deceptive advertising.  For one, Centra Tech 
claimed to have a partnership with Mastercard and Visa that would allow Centra 
Tech’s crypto-debit card to operate on top of the credit giants’ existing debit 
networks.238  In reality, these partnerships never existed and were entirely fabricated 
by the company’s founders.239  Perhaps in an attempt to mask these deficiencies, 
Centra Tech embarked on an aggressive advertising campaign that included a 
“Bounty Program” in which social media users were paid to publish favorable 
articles about Centra Tech technology.240  The company even managed to hook social 
media icon Floyd Mayweather who was paid in cash to promote Centra Tech on 
various social media platforms.241  All of these efforts helped to raise thirty-two 
million dollars for the company’s founders.242 
In response to the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, the magistrate 
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judge analyzed the likelihood of the success on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims,243 
quickly concluding the Centra Tech tokens qualified as securities under the Howey 
Test and the ICO qualified as an investment contract.244  However, the brevity of the 
magistrate’s report leaves much to be desired, specifically with respect to how the 
“expectation of profit” prong might apply differently to a token having a strong 
utilitarian function.  Indeed, as one commentator noted, the magistrate judge simply 
assumed that an expectation of profit existed without analyzing how and by whom 
that expectation was created.245  This assumption seems justified considering how 
Centra focused extensively on the token’s profitability in its advertising materials.  
However, the Centra Tech action did not resolve how a token whose increase in value 
is incidental or secondary to its primary function would perform under the Howey 
Test.246  
Given how the Centra Tech ICO was steeped in fraudulent practices, it is no 
surprise that the project’s young developers were recently indicted by the SEC.247  
The architects of the Centra Tech scheme never intended to produce a viable 
blockchain-based product–they were only interested in harnessing the zeal 
surrounding cryptocurrencies as a tool to defraud investors and make a quick buck.  
Moreover, the Centra Tech tokens had no semblance of functionality at the time of 
the ICO.  As one commentator from the law firm DLA Piper noted: “[t]he courts that 
are currently evaluating whether tokens qualify as securities are focusing their 
attention on non-functional token sales tainted by fraud allegations.  In the [Rensel 
case], the [Centra] tokens had no utility at the time of their sale and the promised 
technology had yet to be developed.”248  
In light of the securities fraud and crafty schemes perpetrated by the above-
mentioned ICOs, it may seem as though the entire industry is comprised of swindlers 
and charlatans.  While the most egregious actors grab headlines and draw the ire of 
the SEC, not all ICOs are tainted by fraud.  For example, on December 11, 2017, the 
SEC published its administrative agreement with California-based blockchain start-
up Munchee, Inc.249  Munchee spent several years developing a blockchain based 
restaurant review application for the iPhone.250  Through the use of its app, Munchee 
hoped to compete with Yelp and Google by designing a solution to the 
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disproportionate number of negative and/or fraudulent reviews directed at restaurant 
owners.251  The Munchee network incentivized end users to post pictures and review 
restaurants by rewarding them with a Munchee token; end users could then spend 
this token at participating restaurants while the restaurants themselves would be able 
to exchange tokens for advertising within the network.252 
Most significantly (and in stark contrast to the above ICOs), the Munchee 
application was successfully launched in the second quarter of 2017, well in advance 
of its whitepaper and its ICO.253  This is to say that the Munchee ICO was not a 
spontaneous cash grab; the company worked for several years to develop and launch 
its product but chose to hold an ICO in order to raise further capital and to improve 
their product–a fact acknowledged by the SEC in its administrative settlement.254  
The Munchee application itself was blockchain based but developed without tokens 
in mind–end users were directly incentivized by the restaurants themselves offering 
small items in exchange for reviews.255  Andrew Chapin, a consultant on the 
Munchee ICO and writer for Medium, noted that:  
When management learned of the ICO market, they saw an opportunity to improve 
their product through token integration. If a partner restaurant incentivized users 
with a token, they reasoned, it might encourage more activity. The end-user could 
review Restaurant A and Restaurant B, earn Munchee tokens by doing so, and 
redeem those tokens at Restaurant A, B, C, or even D.256 
Thus, the Munchee ICO appeared to be a sincere and good faith attempt at 
expanding the application’s functionality without using traditional methods of 
fundraising.257   
 What eventually sank the Munchee ICO is a combination of several factors.  
The company’s whitepaper took its token integration too far by outlining an 
economic “ecosystem” highlighting the token’s expected increase in value as well 
its acceptance in secondary markets.258  This “expectation of future profits” was 
promoted to the public in articles such as 7 Reasons You Need to Join the Munchee 
Token Generation Event and through podcasts by one of Munchee’s founders.259  In 
particular, the SEC remarked how Munchee’s advertising was not directed to 
existing users of the network or to the restaurant industry itself.  Instead, Munchee 
promoted its ICO on platforms aimed at cryptocurrency and digital asset investors, 
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suggesting the sale was more of a cash grab than an attempt to introduce its product 
to relevant consumers.260   
 Another theory is that the SEC was upset with the hubris on display in the 
Munchee whitepaper.  Foreseeing how their ICO could be classified a security, the 
company made a number of spurious statements regarding the application of the 
Howey Test–even going so far as to draw readers’ attention to the SEC’s DAO 
report.261  For one, the whitepaper declares “[t]his White Paper does not constitute 
the offering of a security.”262  More significantly, the whitepaper also states that “a 
Howey analysis had been conducted to determine that, as currently designed, the sale 
of [Munchee] utility tokens does not pose a significant risk of implicating federal 
securities laws.”263  Obviously, this proved to be quite erroneous and in actuality the 
whitepaper contained no analysis of the Howey Test as it applied to the Munchee 
tokens–the company simply concluded that it was not offering securities without any 
proof.  Additionally (and ironically), Munchee’s whitepaper contained a “Forward-
Looking Statement Disclaimer” that expressly characterized its whitepaper as a 
“forward-looking statement” within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995.264  The irony of this is that despite concluding the Munchee 
token was not a security within the meaning of the Howey Test, the Munchee 
developers nonetheless attempted to avail themselves of a legal defense available 
only to securities offerings, suggesting that Munchee wanted to have their cake and 
eat it too.  
 Ultimately, Munchee acquiesced to the SEC’s cease and desist order, 
immediately refunding the $60,000 it had raised from forty investors.265  In addition 
to the expectation of profits created by the “ecosystem” Munchee developed, the 
SEC further noted that such profits depended entirely on the managerial efforts of 
others, commenting that “[i]nvestors had little choice but to rely on Munchee and its 
expertise.”266  Despite the practical utility of the Munchee token, the economic 
realities of the ICO transformed the Munchee token into a security.  
One principle that emerges from the actions of CentraTech, Recoin/Zaslavskiy, 
AriseBank, and Munchee is that simply labeling a token a “utility token” does not 
erase its status as a security in the presence of certain facts.  However, it is unclear 
whether tokens that are not only labeled “utility” but also possess a clear functional 
purpose and history would also be classified as securities.  The Munchee token came 
very close; its token had a functional purpose and was identified as a “utility” token 
by its whitepaper.267  However, the utilitarian aspects of the Munchee token were 
overshadowed by the profit-seeking nature of its sale.  Hopefully, clarification 
regarding legitimate utility tokens will come with time as regulations and ICO 
jurisprudence are still in their infancy; recent legal actions have targeted only the 
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most egregious ICOs, i.e., those engaged in obviously fraudulent business practices.  
IV. SOLUTIONS AND FORECASTING  
A. SAFT Framework 
In the divided regulatory regime of the United States, the private sector is often 
in the best position to address regulatory imbalances and uncertainties.  In October 
2017, a group of blockchain industry participants published a whitepaper entitled 
“The SAFT Project: Toward a Compliant Token Sale Framework.”  The Simple 
Agreement for Future Tokens (“SAFT”) framework attempts to craft a regulatory 
framework for token sales within the boundaries of existing securities law.268  The 
framework is based off of the Simple Agreement for Future Equity (“SAFE”), a 
securities tool that has recently become popular with tech startups.  The SAFE is a 
type of alternative financial note somewhere in the middle between convertible debt 
and normal equity; an investor contributes capital to a start-up venture and in 
exchange, receives a contractual note entitling the investor to equity once the 
company is formally valued through priced investment or liquidation.269  The 
ultimate value of the equity received is determined during the first round of financing 
with reference to the company’s total valuation.270  Similarly, SAFT is an investment 
contract that obligates investors to fund early stage blockchain projects.271  
Developers use the contributed capital to build a “genuinely functional network, with 
genuinely function utility tokens” that are delivered to the investor once the network 
and tokens are deployed and functional.272  
Interestingly, the SAFT framework does not eschew the label “security” but 
rather embraces it.273  The authors assert that token sales–if structured properly under 
the SAFT framework–will initially be classified as securities but once the network 
is functional, the tokens will instead be classified as “consumptive products . . . 
demand[ing] compliance with state and federal consumer protection laws.”274  The 
SAFT framework addresses utility tokens specifically, and draws a clear distinction 
between “pre-functional utility tokens–those issued before a platform is operational–
and fully functional utility tokens–those issued after the platform is functional.”275  
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As an investment contract, the SAFT must comply with securities laws.276  However, 
once the functional tokens are delivered to investors, they are re-classified as 
commodities subject to consumer protection laws.277  To support this shifting 
classification, the SAFT whitepaper argues that pre-functional tokens will always 
satisfy the Howey Test because their value is contingent upon the successful efforts 
of its promoters.278  Conversely, the value of functional tokens is determined by 
myriad market factors that–according to the SAFT authors–will outweigh the 
“efforts of others” component of the Howey Test.279 
The SAFT framework contains a legal analysis of the Howey Test that could be 
seen as impressive simply for the fact that–unlike virtually every other blockchain 
project–the SAFT authors actually took the time to establish some legal precedent 
for their arguments.280  For instance, the SAFT whitepaper explains that direct token 
presales will always satisfy the “expectation of profits prong” of the Howey Test 
because, per the Supreme Court’s reasoning in United Housing Foundation v. 
Forman, purchasers of pre-functional tokens are predominately motivated by the 
expectation of profits, i.e., the tokens have no functional purpose other than a 
speculative increase in value.281  
From this point, the SAFT whitepaper transitions into a discussion of the Howey 
Test’s fourth prong, “the efforts of others.”282  Drawing upon the Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning in S.E.C v. Glenn Turner Enterprises, the whitepaper argues that the 
correct approach to this element asks “whether the efforts made by those other than 
the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts 
which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.”283  The authors argue that 
purchasers of already functional tokens are predominately motivated by a 
consumptive desire to utilize the tokens for their various functions: “as network fees, 
membership coupons, value staking mechanisms, currencies, etc.”284  Similar to 
gold, silver, and other commodities–the value of functional utility tokens in this 
context is dependent upon traditional principles of supply and demand rather than 
the success or failure of the seller’s efforts.285   
This distinction is critical because, according to the SAFT framework, 
developers/promoters have already expended their “essential efforts” into the 
enterprise, and while developers may continue to improve the network, the effect of 
those efforts upon the value of the token is dwarfed by market fluctuations beyond 
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the developer’s control.286  The existence of a secondary market/exchange platform, 
the authors claim, is a red herring for purposes of the Howey Test because such 
platforms are simply the venue for executing a token exchange and have no bearing 
on the token’s price fluctuations.287  Conversely, purchasers of pre-functional tokens 
must rely upon the efforts of developers for their tokens to have any utility or value 
in the future; at this stage, the success of the project is inextricably tied to the token’s 
value.  
Intuitively there is some legitimacy to these arguments, especially if tokens are 
thought of narrowly like traditional commodities such as gold and silver.  However, 
several commentators have noted the potential pitfalls of the SAFT framework.288  
For example, the Cardozo Blockchain Project, an initiative from Cardozo Law 
School exploring the legal issues of blockchain technology, published a 2017 critique 
of the SAFT framework entitled “Not so Fast–Risks Related to the use of a ‘SAFT’ 
for Token Sales.”289  The Cardozo report raises a number of concerns regarding token 
sales under the SAFT framework.  Broadly speaking, the authors are concerned the 
SAFT framework erroneously suggests that the application of the Howey Test turns 
only on the four bright-line rules established in the original action, SEC v. W.J. 
Howey Co.290  What the SAFT framework ignores, the authors assert, is that the 
Howey Test is a highly fact-dependent inquiry that looks at the “substance” and 
“economic realities” of a transaction rather than its labels–an approach repeatedly 
affirmed by both the Supreme Court and the SEC.291  Indeed, the SAFT framework 
is very dependent on the somewhat arbitrary distinction between functional and non-
functional tokens.  The SAFT authors speculate that once tokens have legitimate 
functionality, purchasers’ predominate motivations will be consumptive rather than 
profit-driven.  This could very well be true for certain tokens (again, the inquiry is 
always fact-dependent) but the presence of even genuine functionality does not 
entirely eliminate purchasers’ expectation of profits.  
Additionally, the Cardozo report takes aim at some of the legal analogies drawn 
by the SAFT authors, as well as the framework’s unusual shift from selling an 
investment contract that is at first a “security” but eventually becomes a 
“commodity” by virtue of its functionality.292  Curiously, the initial investment 
contract (pre-network development) is directed exclusively towards accredited 
investors who must contractually disclaim any intention to use the contract 
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consumptively and affirm their intention to realize only profits from the investment 
contract.293  Because of this disclaimer, tokens offered under the SAFT framework 
will presumably stress the profit-making potential in its marketing materials.  
Touting the investment and profit potential of tokens during a SAFT sale process 
may well impact a federal securities law analysis of a token developed pursuant to 
a SAFT . . . in many cases, the SAFT sales process and related marketing materials 
could impact the ‘economic realities’ of purchasing or selling these tokens.294 
To the Cardozo authors, “bifurcating the purchase of tokens through a SAFT” 
only alters the form of the transaction rather than its substance, and as noted in 
Howey, “form [should be] disregarded for substance.”295  Moreover, targeting only 
accredited investors (often wealthy and powerful individuals and corporations) with 
the initial investment contract will result in tokens becoming concentrated in the 
hands of the few–the antithesis of the decentralized, democratic spirit at the heart of 
blockchain technology.  Furthermore, this may cause investors to be concerned only 
with the profitability of the token’s eventual sale rather than with the network’s 
success generally, and because such investors will likely hold a significant share of 
the network’s tokens, they can exert a high degree of influence to achieve their goals.  
Finally, the Cardozo report criticizes the SAFT framework’s comparisons to 
legal cases in which sales contracts for the purchase of to-be-delivered “natural 
resources” were held not to implicate federal securities laws.296  Specifically, the 
Cardozo report argues that the SAFT framework paints with a broad brush when it 
asserts that crypto-tokens are analogous to homogenous commodities such as gold, 
silver, or sugar–noting that crypto-tokens often confer various “rights, features, and 
obligations” not present in physical commodities.297  It is worth noting that the SAFT 
distinction between pre- and post-sale seller efforts finds some support in S.E.C v. 
Life Partners, Inc., in which the D.C. Circuit held, “pre-purchase services cannot by 
themselves suffice to make the profits of an investment arise predominantly from the 
efforts of others, and that ministerial functions should receive a good deal less weight 
than entrepreneurial activities.”298  At first, this statement appears to support the 
framework’s conclusion that a SAFT token does not derive profits solely from the 
“efforts of others” because such efforts are “pre-purchase services.”  However, as 
noted by the Cardozo authors, the SAFT framework’s crucial timing distinction 
between the managerial efforts expended by developers prior to token functionality, 
and managerial efforts expended after token deployment, was expressly rejected by 
the Eleventh Circuit in S.E.C v. Mutual Benefits Corporation.299  In that case, the 
court reasoned “investment schemes may often involve a combination of both pre- 
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and post-purchase managerial activities, both of which should be taken into 
consideration in determining whether Howey’s test is satisfied.”300  Again, the SAFT 
framework simply states, without any justification, that efforts expended by 
developers to maintain or promote the token's post-token deployment will be de 
minimus and subordinate to the market effects of supply and demand.   
It may be true that such post-deployment efforts are “ministerial efforts” that are 
“non-essential” and insufficient to satisfy the Howey Test.  However, even with the 
court’s reasoning in Life Partners, if those post-deployment efforts possess any 
semblance of an “entrepreneurial activity” then a court could easily make a finding 
that the token is a security.  Under the SAFT framework, developers will be hard-
pressed to ensure that any post-sale efforts are exclusively administrative and 
insignificant in nature.  Otherwise, the token runs the risk of being classified as a 
security.  While the SAFT framework is not without its pitfalls, it does present a 
novel approach that could be useful to developers looking to hold an ICO in 
compliance with securities laws.  
B. Partnership Law 
 The SAFT framework seems over-engineered at times and relies on arbitrary 
distinctions not fully supported by caselaw.  A more simplified solution is presented 
in a recent article published in the Columbia Business Law Review.301  The article, 
ICO’s, DAO’s, and the SEC: A Partnership Solution, proposes that ICOs organize 
themselves under what the author terms a “decentralized partnership.”302  The 
partnership agreement is offered to the public digitally in the form of a smart contract 
containing an ICO token.303  The smart contract (vis-a-vis tokens) will outline and 
govern the key aspects of a partnership agreement including: the right to transfer 
interests, the sharing of profits and liabilities, and specific governing rights.304  Most 
importantly, “[a] Decentralized Partnership has an essential quality differentiating 
the form from a corporation: there is no separation between ownership and 
control.”305  The decentralized partnership solution presents a prescient model for 
the future of collective, democratic investments.  For one, any liabilities (legal or 
otherwise) would be borne across all token holders, creating joint and several liability 
across the network.306  Additionally, avoiding securities registration creates more 
egalitarian investment opportunities.  Current exemptions to SEC registration require 
companies to issue securities via private placements only to accredited investors, i.e., 
those with a net worth over one million dollars or substantial annual income.  
However, such rules exclude the general public and are inapposite to the 
decentralized, democratic nature of blockchains.307 
The partnership solution consolidates ownership and control, distributing the 
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burden among all invested parties.  This suggests ICOs created through partnership 
agreements will not satisfy the “efforts of others” prong of the Howey Test.  As equal 
partners in the venture, the success of the ICO will depend upon all partners rather 
than the central promoter or developer.  This approach is consistent with the spirit of 
blockchains, which prefer democratic control rather than a central authority.  
However, to avoid a security classification, the roles and rights of a partnership must 
be truly egalitarian at the time of investment.  Similar to the issues present in the 
SAFT framework, if developers retain any semblance of managerial control over the 
network post-partnership formation, it will be difficult to characterize their efforts as 
“pre-purchase services.”  
C. Finding Room for Utility Tokens 
The SEC has the choice of whether to include crypto-tokens within the definition 
of securities or to craft new regulations directly applicable to ICOs.  In terms of 
avoiding securities registration, utility tokens are the only crypto-tokens with the 
potential to do so.  Assuming utility tokens are not swept up in the definition of 
securities, developers should first ensure a stable blockchain platform exists that is 
independent of any crypto-token.  Additionally, any whitepaper published by a 
developer should focus on explaining the token’s functionality within the network–
any potential increase in value should be de-emphasized as a natural consequence of 
the token’s use.  When creating new registration requirements specific to ICOs, the 
SEC should mandate that tokens have verifiable functionality.  To that end, one 
commentator writing for the Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review 
suggests requiring a standardized whitepaper for all ICOs.308  At a minimum, the 
author suggests that the standardized whitepaper should inform purchasers “(1) what 
problems the company’s blockchain project solves; (2) what rights a token holder 
will and will not receive; (3) when the blockchain project will be completed; and (4) 
why a token is necessary in the first place.”309  Additional disclosure requirements 
could include information about the company’s founders, corporate structure, etc.310 
A standardized whitepaper would impose no additional burdens on ICOs 
because, as referenced throughout this analysis, all reputable ICOs already publish 
whitepapers.  Additionally, a standardized form has the added benefit of eliminating 
the “facts and circumstances” analysis currently used by the SEC.  As the steward of 
our capital markets, the SEC has a duty to ensure emerging businesses are not 
operating in the dark.  Moreover, heightened disclosure requirements will force out 
fraudulent ICOs who will be unable to accurately and truthfully describe their 
projects.  ICOs are currently plagued by misinformation that unfairly casts legitimate 
operations in a bad light.  It seems unlikely that legitimate ICOs would oppose 
disclosure requirements that would help separate the wheat from the chaff.  
Title III of the JOBS Act granted a registration exemption under section 4(a)(6) 
of the ’33 Act for companies selling securities through crowdfunding mechanisms.311  
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Termed “Regulation Crowdfunding,” the exemption limits the total amount of 
securities sold to $1,070,000 and caps each individual sale at the greater of $2200 or 
five percent of the purchaser’s yearly income or net worth.312  Additionally, 
transactions made under this exemption must be executed using intermediaries, in 
this case, SEC approved crowdfunding portals.313  Crowdfunded securities are also 
subject to substantial alienation restrictions for one year following the sale.314   
While some commentators have noted the problems of having such a low 
transaction ceiling,315 start-up blockchain projects with little to no capital may find 
the sale cap insignificant–at least for the first round of investments.  Moreover, the 
disclosure and reporting requirements under this exemption are much less 
burdensome than typical securities sales.316  Finally, Regulation Crowdfunding 
abrogates the issuer’s ability to advertise the sale publicly by limiting advertisements 
to plain statements of sale price made only through the SEC’s approved portal.317  
This may seem unnecessarily restrictive, but given how poor and deceptive 
advertising practices have hurt ICOs in recent years, perhaps this limitation is 
warranted.  However, it is more difficult to reconcile the SEC’s intermediary 
requirement because blockchain technology inherently rejects middlemen.  Despite 
these restrictions, the well-tailored Regulation Crowdfunding evidences the SEC’s 
ability to craft regulations that are suitable to new methods of raising capital and with 
a bit of tinkering, similar carve-outs could be created for ICOs.  
With respect to marketing and advertising, ICO promotors should be meticulous 
with token marketing and design.  Any advertising of the ICO should be directed to 
potential users of the network and should avoid claims of profitability or ostentatious 
endorsements by celebrities.  If blockchains are to find credibility in the marketplace, 
developers should work to distance their projects from these sentiments, especially 
if the SEC decides to include utility tokens within the definition of securities.  This 
could be facilitated by extending Rule 10b-5 liability to include utility tokens.318  
However, this move also risks over-inclusivity–ICOs would have to defend against 
potentially hollow accusations of fraud, even in the face of heightened pleading 
requirements.  To mitigate litigious threats, the SEC could expand the safe harbor 
for forward looking statements to apply to utility token sales.319  A forward-looking 
statement is “[a statement] accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements 
identifying important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from 
those in the forward-looking statement.”320  Because blockchain technology is in its 
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infancy and prone to unforeseen failures, good faith statements about a project’s 
future success that later turn out to be false, should not result in liability to the 
project’s developers.  
CONCLUSION 
 Above all, Congress and the SEC have a duty to protect investors without 
stifling economic growth.321  It seems unlikely blockchains or ICOs will fall by the 
wayside and thus, the SEC should work towards eliminating fraudulent ICOs while 
supporting the inclusion of legitimate blockchain projects.  In a best-case scenario, 
this would take the form of new regulations specifically tailored to ICOs.  These 
regulations should include heightened disclosure requirements, lowered registration 
costs, and a moderate degree of liability.  The United States court system is ill-
equipped to analyze ICOs according to existing securities law.  Additional 
jurisprudence, in the absence of new legislation, will only muddy the waters further 
and leave blockchain projects and their attendant ICOs uncertain of their legal status.  
Thus, the SEC should begin crafting new exemptions to accommodate ICOs and 
their unique structure.322  
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